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Abstract 
The Federal Pell Grant Program is the nation’s largest need-based grant program. While 
students’ initial eligibility for the Pell is based on financial need, renewal is contingent on 
meeting minimum academic standards similar to those in models of performance-based 
scholarships, including a grade point average (GPA) requirement and ratio of credits completed 
compared to those attempted. In this study, we describe federal satisfactory academic progress 
(SAP) requirements and illustrate the policy’s implementation in a statewide community college 
system. Using state administrative data, we demonstrate that a substantial portion of Pell 
recipients are at risk for Pell ineligibility due to their failure to meet SAP GPA or credit 
completion requirements. We then leverage the GPA component of the policy to explore the 
impacts of failure to meet standards on early college persistence and achievement, earning a 
credential, and transferring to a four-year college using two methodological approaches: 
regression discontinuity (RD) and difference-in-differences (DD). Our results across the two 
approaches are mixed, with the RD providing null estimates and the DD indicating some 
statistically significant impacts, including a negative effect on early college persistence. We 
conclude by discussing the implications for future research. 
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Need-based financial aid is a widely used tool to promote college attainment, with the 
federal government delivering $185.1 billion in aid to undergraduates in 2013 (Baum & Payea, 
2013). The Federal Pell Grant Program is the single largest source of need-based financial aid for 
college students in the United States, providing aid to over a third of undergraduates (Baum & 
Payea, 2013). While eligibility is initially based purely on financial need, recipients must meet 
satisfactory academic progress (SAP) requirements to maintain eligibility for Pell Grants beyond 
the first year. Institutions have flexibility regarding how they define SAP but commonly require 
students to maintain a cumulative grade point average (GPA) of 2.0 or higher and to complete at 
least two thirds of the course credits they attempt. Those who fail to meet the SAP requirements 
at the end of the institution’s evaluation period may continue to receive aid for one additional 
term, but if they are still failing SAP at the end of that term, they may lose eligibility for Pell. 
The academic requirements for Pell Grant renewal have received little attention from 
researchers and policymakers, despite their potentially broad consequences. Forty-five percent of 
Pell Grant recipients entering postsecondary institutions do not enroll for a second year of 
college (authors’ calculations, Beginning Postsecondary Students: 2004/2009). While 
performance-based scholarships have risen in popularity, the performance-based aspects of the 
nation’s largest need-based grant program have gone virtually unstudied. How many students fail 
to meet SAP standards? Do the bureaucratic hurdles posed by the standards contribute to the 
observed low rates of persistence among Pell recipients? The prevalence of SAP failure and its 
consequences in terms of persistence, achievement, and degree attainment are unknown. 
Since SAP policy was first enacted in the late 1970s, enrollment in college has soared. 
Educational expansion and increasing diversity among college students (particularly in academic 
preparedness), paired with rising college costs, mean that more students than ever face the 
 potential repercussions of SAP policy. In light of these trends, there is a clear need for more 
information about SAP policy and its effects on student outcomes.  
National estimates highlight the need to look closer at SAP policies and their impact on 
student outcomes. As demonstrated in Figure 1, approximately one in five (21 percent) first-year 
Pell recipients nationally was at risk of losing their Pell due to the SAP GPA criterion alone in 
2012. The rate has risen over time since 2004, particularly at public two-year colleges, where 
nearly a quarter of first-year Pell recipients failed to attain a 2.0 at the end of their first year. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
In this paper, we estimate the prevalence of SAP failure in a large state community 
college system. To explore the implications of failing to meet SAP requirements on student 
outcomes, we use state administrative data to evaluate the effects on early college achievement, 
persistence, institutional transfer, and degree attainment. We use both regression-discontinuity 
(RD) and difference-in-differences (DD) approaches to estimate the consequences of failing to 
meet the SAP GPA requirement. The RD determines the effect of the policy on Pell recipients 
who just miss the cutoff by comparing them to Pell recipients who just make the cutoff, while the 
DD determines the effect of falling below the cutoff for Pell recipients (including those further 
below the cutoff, rather than just at the margin) by comparing Pell recipients to students who are 
not subject to SAP standards (those without federal financial aid).  
To our knowledge, this is the first empirical examination of SAP policy since the 1980s 
and the first to use multi-institutional data. This paper makes several contributions. First, we 
clearly outline the federal guidelines for SAP evaluation by postsecondary institutions receiving 
federal financial aid and describe how evaluation is implemented in a state community college 
system. Second, we theorize how SAP policy may impact student outcomes, drawing from prior 
 research on performance-based aid and academic probation. Third, we provide empirical 
evidence regarding the prevalence and consequences of SAP failure in a statewide community 
college system.  
Approximately 25 percent of first-year Pell recipients fail to attain a 2.0 GPA in our 
statewide community college sample, in line with our estimates from national data. After 
accounting for the credit completion requirement, the first-year SAP failure rate approaches 40 
percent. Findings on the consequences of SAP failure are somewhat mixed. The RD analysis 
does not yield statistically significant results, while the DD estimates suggest that failing SAP 
discourages persistence after the first year of college. We conclude with a discussion of the 
assumptions of each technique and the implications of results. 
Policy Background 
Origins of Satisfactory Academic Progress and Federal/Institutional Roles 
In 1976, the term “academic progress” was introduced into federal financial aid 
legislation as an amendment to the Higher Education Act of 1965. The amendment stipulated 
that, to receive financial assistance under Title IV, students must demonstrate “satisfactory 
progress” toward a degree (Bennett & Grothe, 1982). The legislation did not explicitly define 
satisfactory progress, but the Interim Final Regulations in 1978 stated that an institution should 
evaluate progress by establishing a “normal time frame” for completing the course of study and 
by measuring grades or work “against a norm” (Bennett & Grothe, 1982, p. 1). Since then, the 
policy has evolved to be more explicit in its terms while still allowing institutions to determine, 
within certain confines, how best to evaluate academic progress. 
Today, students receiving federal financial assistance must be evaluated at the end of 
each academic year by their institution. An institution’s definition of SAP must align with its 
 standards for graduation and be “at least as strict” as the academic policy applied to students not 
receiving assistance from Title IV programs (Satisfactory Academic Progress, 2013, p. 546; 
Student Eligibility, 2013, p. 571). The language of the federal policy offers some flexibility, but 
institutions must set a “qualitative standard,” in which students meet a cumulative GPA of 2.0 or 
its academic equivalent by the end of their second academic year; a “quantitative standard,” in 
which there is a “minimum percentage of work” successfully completed; and a “maximum 
timeframe” standard, in which students finish a program within 150 percent of its published 
length (Satisfactory Academic Progress, 2013, p. 546). 
Students who do not meet an institution’s SAP standards become ineligible to receive 
federal financial aid. However, the federal legislation includes an appeals clause, allowing 
institutions to waive the provisions of the SAP policy if a student faces “undue hardship,” such 
as the death of a relative, personal injury or illness, or “any special circumstances as determined 
by the institution” (Student Eligibility, 2013, p. 571). 
Rules in Effect for Students in State Administrative Sample 
In this study, we explore the application of SAP guidelines within a subset of colleges 
within a state community college system that evaluates student progress at the end of each term. 
To meet SAP requirements at the end of each term, students needed to earn a cumulative GPA of 
2.0 or higher, complete 67 percent of all credit hours attempted, and finish their program within 
the maximum timeframe. SAP guidelines were included in students’ financial aid letters, 
published in each college’s course catalogs and financial aid office webpages, and, at some 
institutions, available on “quick facts” handouts provided by the financial aid office. 
At the end of each term, colleges notified students of their SAP status. Students who met 
the minimum SAP standards were deemed satisfactory, while students who had not earned the 
 required GPA or credit completion rate were placed on warning for the subsequent semester. 
Students on warning were able to receive aid but risked financial aid termination if they 
continued to fail to meet SAP standards. Upon failing to meet standards during the warning term, 
students could appeal to continue receiving federal and state financial aid. Financial aid was 
terminated for students who did not appeal or made unsuccessful appeal attempts. Students with 
successful appeals entered a probation period of one term. Students on probation-by-appeal who 
failed to meet SAP standards subsequently lost aid eligibility. 
Theoretical Perspective and Previous Literature 
Theoretical Perspective 
 Informed primarily by the economic literature, we posit that SAP standards affect student 
behavior through three possible mechanisms. First, SAP policy may provide students with a clear 
signal about their own performance relative to institutional expectations for success. Manski 
(1989) and Altonji (1993) described college as a process of experimentation and learning about 
one’s abilities. Without a clear signal such as that provided by SAP, some students may persist 
with a low level of performance, not realizing it will prevent them from graduating. Receiving 
this signal may induce some students to drop out. Second, as shown by Bénabou and Tirole 
(2002) in a simple principal-agent model (with parents or policymakers as principals and 
students as agents), setting minimum performance standards creates incentives for individuals 
near the performance threshold to increase effort, while it creates incentives for some students 
far below the standard to drop out. The effects of such of policy will, therefore, vary across 
individuals, and the overall benefit will depend on the magnitude of these competing effects. 
Finally, even if individuals do not respond to SAP’s academic incentives, the loss of financial aid 
for those who do not improve performance increases the price students pay for continued 
 enrollment, inducing additional dropout among students who face credit constraints and/or 
conclude that the costs of continued enrollment no longer justify the benefits. 
Previous Literature 
To our knowledge, there is no prior empirical work evaluating how SAP requirements 
impact students receiving need-based aid. Extant research on SAP policies is sparse, dated, and 
limited to descriptive studies of policy implementation within individual institutions (e.g., 
Bennett & Grothe, 1982; McNair & Taylor, 1988). Nonetheless, we gain helpful insights from 
related work examining how students respond to academic probation policies, performance-
based financial aid, and financial aid receipt in general.  
Academic Probation. The prior study arguably most similar to this one is an 
examination by Lindo, Sanders, & Oreopoulos (2010) of how students respond to being placed 
on academic probation. Even students not receiving financial aid still typically face the threat of 
academic probation, particularly at four-year colleges, if they fall below a minimum GPA 
threshold. Those who fail to improve by the end of the probationary period may no longer be 
permitted to register. Lindo, Sanders, & Oreopoulos (2010) draw upon the Bénabou and Tirole 
(2002) model to show how such policies can generate either positive or negative effort 
incentives, depending upon how far a student is from meeting the standard. The authors use a 
regression-discontinuity (RD) design on administrative data from a public four-year institution in 
Canada to compare students just above and below the minimum GPA threshold at the end of 
their first year. They find that students just below the threshold who are placed on academic 
probation are less likely to return the next year, but that those who do return improve their 
grades. A more recent RD study of academic probation policies at a public four-year institution 
in the United States found similar patterns (Casey, Cline, Ost, & Qureshi, 2015). The findings 
 also suggested that short-term improvements in GPA appear attributable to strategic course-
taking, rather than increased effort—probationary students attempted fewer credits and enrolled 
in easier courses, (Casey, Cline, Ost, & Qureshi, 2015). 
SAP standards have many similarities to academic probation standards. Students on 
financial aid, however, may be even more sensitive to these types of performance standards 
given the financial consequences. An additional limitation of prior work on academic probation 
is that while theory predicts such standards should have heterogeneous effects depending upon 
how far students are from the threshold, the RD methodologies used in prior work only examine 
effects at the threshold. Our context will allow us to employ both an RD as well as a difference-
in-difference design (comparing students on financial aid, who are subject to SAP, with students 
not on financial aid), with the latter allowing us to say something about the effects of the policy 
for students further below the threshold.  
Performance-based aid. A number of prior studies have explored the effects of 
performance-based financial aid. One strand of this literature focuses on large state merit-aid 
programs that typically require students not only to meet performance criteria in order to receive 
the scholarship, but to meet academic performance criteria each year to continue receiving aid 
(Cornwell, Lee, & Mustard, 2005; Cornwell, Mustard, & Sridhar, 2006; Dynarski, 2008). 
Research on West Virginia’s PROMISE scholarship, a state merit-based scholarship program for 
qualifying high school graduates who maintain a minimum GPA and course load during college, 
indicates substantial impacts at the requirement thresholds, supporting the notion that academic 
incentives promote academic effort (Scott-Clayton, 2011). Still, many recipients of merit-based 
scholarships lose eligibility due to ongoing performance standards and those students who just 
barely lose aid have worse college outcomes than those who just barely keep it (Carruthers & 
 Ozek, 2013; Henry, Rubenstein, & Bugler, 2004). Furthermore, while programs like WV’s 
PROMISE illustrate the effectiveness of incentives for a population with demonstrated prior 
academic success, it is unclear whether such standards are similarly effective when applied to a 
less-high-achieving population, such as need-based aid recipients.  
MDRC, however, has run a number of experiments testing the effectiveness of 
performance-based scholarships for students receiving Pell Grants. The awards are not 
conditioned on prior academic achievement and, instead, are supplemental grants (i.e., provided 
in addition to existing aid) earned over the course of a term by meeting academic benchmarks 
(Welbeck, Ware, Cerna, & Valenzuela, 2014). Advocates expect to see improved achievement, 
progress through requirements, and degree attainment as a function of tying aid to performance 
benchmarks (Mayer, Patel, Rudd & Ratledge, 2015).  
The Opening Doors Demonstration in Louisiana was MDRC’s first experiment with 
performance-based awards. Results indicated that the program increased persistence in the 
second semester and credit accumulation in the first year (Barrow et al., 2014; Richburg-Hayes 
et al., 2009; study follow-up was curtailed due to Hurricane Katrina). Its positive impacts 
inspired the launch of the national Performance-Based Scholarship (PBS) Demonstration in 
2008, which tested variations of PBS in six different sites across the country. Results from these 
additional sites indicated improvement in credit accumulation after the first year and little effect 
on persistence, but modest effects on degree completion (3 percentage points) five years after 
entry (Mayer et al., 2015).  
Taken together, these findings indicate that performance incentives may be effective for 
students across a range of prior achievement in various contexts. Still, SAP may affect students 
differently because it is a negative incentive that threatens students’ foundational aid, rather than 
 a positive incentive to receive extra assistance. Separate from the literature on academic 
standards and performance-based aid, it is helpful to consider SAP policy in light of what we 
know about the effectiveness of financial aid generally, because students who fail to meet SAP 
ultimately face the consequence of losing their aid eligibility completely.   
Need-Based Financial Aid. Need-based financial aid aims to offset the challenges faced 
by low-income students by alleviating financial constraints. Financial aid through grants has 
been shown to improve enrollment, persistence, credit accumulation, and degree attainment (e.g., 
Bettinger, 2004; Dynarski, 2003; Goldrick-Rab, Kelchen, Harris, & Benson, forthcoming). 
Evidence is somewhat more mixed in the two-year setting (see Angrist, Autor, Hudson, & 
Pallais, 2014; Barrow, Richburg-Hayes, Rouse & Brock, 2014; Castleman & Long, 2013; 
Cohodes & Goodman, 2014; Kane, 1995). However, students at community colleges appear to 
be particularly sensitive to tuition and discounts (Attewell, Heil, & Reisel, 2011; Denning, 2014; 
Martorell, McCall, & McFarlin, 2014). 
Much of our knowledge about need-based grants focuses solely on the impact of 
providing money, as though it were offered with no strings attached. But there are bureaucratic 
hurdles for retaining financial aid, including the academic requirements attached to many awards 
(Goldrick-Rab, 2013; Goldrick-Rab et al., forthcoming). Given that financial aid aims to offset 
financial constraints for college students, federal financial aid policy should, at the least, be 
designed to do no harm to students (Scott-Clayton, 2013). The complexity of navigating 
financial aid, even after initially receiving the award, may undermine this simple goal. If students 
are not fully aware of SAP policy, then its effectiveness as an incentive may be undermined. In a 
context of poor information and communication, the primary effect of SAP requirements may be 
punitive—simply removing students from aid eligibility—rather than formative.  
 Research Questions 
The theoretical perspectives and prior empirical literature discussed above drive our 
hypotheses that tying academic standards to need-based aid may both incentivize effort by 
encouraging students within range of the threshold to meet the standards and discourage 
persistence by weeding out some students who are either unable to meet expectations by the end 
of the evaluation period or who decide it is no longer worthwhile to try.  
To determine the magnitude of SAP failure and evaluate the extent to which SAP 
standards impact student achievement (which tests the incentivizing hypothesis), persistence 
(which tests the discouragement hypothesis), as well as transfer and attainment outcomes (related 
to both processes), we ask a series of research questions: 
1. What is the prevalence of failure to meet academic standards in a statewide 
community college system and how is it changing over time? How many Pell 
recipients fail to meet the GPA and credit ratio requirements in a given term, and how 
are these patterns related to student persistence over time? 
2. For Pell recipients in a narrow range around the GPA cutoff for SAP, how does 
failing to meet the GPA standard impact student persistence and student achievement, 
transfer, and degree attainment? 
3. Does failing the GPA standard affect the outcomes of Pell recipients differentially 
compared to students with the same GPAs who are not subject to the standards (i.e., 
non-aid recipients)?  
Data 
To answer our research questions, we use administrative data from a state community 
college system (SCCS) that includes 58 separate public two-year institutions. We restrict the 
 sample to the 49 colleges with equivalent SAP policies, obtained from course catalogs published 
during the sample timeframe. Our available data includes student-level data from first-time 
college entrants in all SCCS colleges from 2001-2010. We focus on cohorts with at least three 
years of follow-up data to track enrollment and transfer behavior, as well as degree attainment, 
which limits us to the 2007 cohort as our final cohort. We were unable to include students from 
the 2001 cohort, as it was missing financial aid data. The final analytic dataset includes a pooled 
sample of 147,380 first-time students, 42,835 of whom received Pell Grants, from six cohorts of 
fall-term enrollees (2002–2007). In our analyses, we pool across the cohorts to maintain our 
robust sample size, although we control for potential cohort effects, as described below. 
The state administrative data track federal and state aid and transcript measures, 
including courses, credits attempted and completed, and grades for each term. The data are 
derived from three sources: SCCS data with student information on demographics, transcripts, 
and financial aid; National Student Clearinghouse graduation data; and Employment Security 
Commission earnings data. Our analytic dataset includes background measures, including race 
(collected by the SCCS as White, Black, “other race,” or Hispanic), gender, age at college entry, 
state residency status, dependency status for financial aid purposes, and high school graduation 
status. We are able to capture whether students work for pay while enrolled, their earnings 
during their first semester (as a proxy for the amount worked during initial enrollment), and their 
expected family contribution (EFC) for financial aid purposes. To understand how SAP failure 
impacts immediate persistence and achievement, we examine enrollment and GPA in the first 
term of the second year of college. Unfortunately, we are unable to capture students’ degree-
seeking status at college entry, and, for that reason, include a variety of outcomes. To explore the 
 implications of SAP for degree and transfer outcomes, we examine certificate and associate 
degree attainment and transfer to a four-year college within three years of initial enrollment. 
State Contexts 
The sampled state consistently falls within the lowest quintile in terms of average 
household-income across the nation (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014). The state also falls in the top 
quintile in terms of poverty rates, with 14 percent of the overall population and 19 percent of 
youth falling below the poverty line at the time of our final cohort (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007). 
The cost of college attendance is also among the lowest in the nation (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2013). The SCCS has substantially lower tuition rates than the national average. In 
2007, the most recent cohort in our analytic sample, the maximum annual tuition and fees (16 
credits per semester) at an SCCS college cost students approximately $1,475, about half of the 
national average of $2,708 for public two-year colleges (U.S. Department of Education, 2013). 
The state’s higher education governance structure includes a statewide governing board 
for the state’s 17 public four-year institutions that is also responsible for statewide planning and 
data collection for all postsecondary institutions, including public community colleges and 
private four-year institutions. There is a separate governing board for the community colleges. 
The two boards collaborate on efforts that concern both sectors, such as aligning curriculum 
across the sectors, which enabled the creation of a statewide transfer articulation agreement. 
An articulation agreement assures community college graduates admission to a state four-
year college, though admission to a specific campus or program is not guaranteed. The 
articulation agreement stipulates that students who earn an associate degree and an overall GPA 
of at least 2.0, in addition to applying to a receiving institution by the stated deadline, will be 
 admitted to a four-year institution. Those denied admission to the specific institution are 
provided information on space availability and contacts at other public colleges in the system.  
Descriptive Statistics 
To describe the students in our sample and to demonstrate how they compare to first-time 
community college students across the nation, we present sample means for Pell and non-Pell 
community college students (based on Pell receipt at college entrance) in our pooled state 
administrative data and in the 2004/2009 Beginning Postsecondary Students Longitudinal Study 
(BPS:04/09) in Table 1. The BPS is a longitudinal study following a nationally representative 
sample of first-time college students, a subset of students from the National Postsecondary 
Student Aid Study of 2004. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
As Table 1 indicates, students in the SCCS sample are, on average, older than in a 
nationally representative sample. While both the BPS and the SCCS samples represent first-time 
college students, it is possible that there is variation in the age of first-time college students 
across states (perhaps reflecting differences in labor markets and college costs). In both the state 
and national data, half of Pell recipients are White, compared with approximately three quarters 
of non-Pell students. Approximately 70 percent of Pell recipients and 50 percent of non-Pell 
students are female. In our state sample, Pell recipients are more likely to have earned a high 
school diploma than non-Pell students. 
Financially, the national and state samples differ across dependency status, employment 
status while enrolled, and EFC. Among Pell recipients, a similar proportion filed as financial 
dependents across the two samples—51 percent of students in the SCCS and 57 percent in the 
BPS. In the SCCS, the majority of the non-Pell students did not apply for financial aid and 
 therefore are “not dependent” for financial aid purposes (the dependency status is unknown 
and/or not applicable for two thirds of these students). Twenty-one percent fewer Pell recipients 
and 22 percent fewer non-Pell students worked for pay during the first semester in the SCCS 
than in the BPS. Finally, the EFC of non-Pell students in the national sample is much higher than 
in the SCCS. The financial differences are likely driven by the low household income in the 
sampled state. Furthermore, since the SCCS has substantially lower tuition than the national 
average, it may attract low-income students or result in fewer students applying for financial aid 
(almost 93 percent of non-Pell students did not file a FAFSA: see table notes in Table 1).  
The non-negligible differences between our single-state sample and national data suggest 
that students in our sample are older and less likely to work for pay during college than a 
nationally representative sample. This may be due to the sluggish labor market in the sampled 
state. While our findings may not be directly generalizable to community college students across 
the nation, our focus on community college students in a state with a higher proportion of low-
income citizens suggests that our results still offer important lessons regarding the impact of 
policies on students attending broad-access colleges, particularly in contexts where a higher than 
average percentage of the population lives in poverty. 
Methods 
We use several analytic approaches to examine the magnitude of SAP failure and its 
effects. First, we demonstrate the prevalence of failure to meet SCCS SAP standards using 
summary statistics. Next, we estimate the effects of SAP failure using two approaches. We 
compare the Pell recipients directly above and below the cutoff using a regression discontinuity 
design (RD). We also compare the effects of falling above and below the cutoff between those 
with and without federal aid in a difference-in-differences analysis (DD). The RD arguably 
 offers greater internal validity, evaluating the impact of SAP policy around the cutoff, where 
students are expected to either narrowly avoid or face penalty. The DD offers more external 
validity, capturing effects across a broader swath of the student population (not just those at the 
cutoff) and allowing us to net out any effects that may be due to more general SCCS academic 
performance standards that apply to all students, rather than SAP policy specifically. 
Failure to meet SAP standards occurs when students fail to achieve a cumulative 2.0 
GPA or obtain a cumulative .67 credit ratio of credits attempted/credits earned at the end of a 
given term, or to complete their program within 150 percent of the maximum stated time frame. 
Due to variation in maximum time frame across programs, we focus on the GPA and credit ratio 
requirements to study descriptive patterns. We then exploit the 2.0 GPA threshold, using 
cumulative GPA at the end of the first year of college (when students are evaluated for Pell 
renewal for the fall of their second year) to test the impacts of SAP on community college 
student persistence, transfer behavior, and degree attainment. The variation in cumulative GPA 
allows us to examine impacts around the cutoff, unlike the measure of credit ratios, which does 
not offer enough variation to estimate the effect of SAP failure (i.e., students do not attempt or 
accumulate many credits in the first year, producing a very lumpy distribution). 
In our analyses, first-year cumulative GPA is an average of grades from fall, spring, and 
summer terms during year 1. For students who drop out, we use their GPA from enrolled terms 
to calculate cumulative GPA. Most students who fail to meet the GPA standard do so in the first 
semester—almost three quarters of those with a cumulative first-year GPA below 2.0 fall in this 
category—and about half appear to be discouraged from enrollment in a subsequent term. 
Almost all of the students who initially fell below 2.0 but reenrolled fail to meet SAP in the 
subsequent term (in fact, less than 1 percent of those who failed in the first term manage to 
 improve their standing). The remainder of students falling below the 2.0 mark in first-year 
cumulative GPA slip below the cutoff for the first time in their second term, and over half do not 
enroll in a subsequent semester. We estimate that, among the students who complete year 1 with 
a cumulative GPA below 2.0, less than 10 percent of students have received only one warning 
(this excludes those that dropped out immediately following their initial failure to meet SAP). 
Because some students are still in warning rather than facing ineligibility, our results may 
underestimate the effect of failing to meet SAP GPA standards on outcomes; some students we 
expect to lose Pell eligibility are actually still eligible and may not experience anticipated 
negative effects. Nonetheless, we choose to focus on students who fall below the GPA cutoff at 
the end of their first year, rather than relying on first-term GPA, to ensure that students have 
attempted enough credits to compute a reliable GPA. While first-term GPA could test the impact 
of receiving a warning, the measure does not offer enough variation to meet the assumptions 
necessary for our regression discontinuity design, described next. 
Regression Discontinuity 
To estimate the effect of SAP, we focus on students whose cumulative GPA falls near the 
cutoff—an approach referred to as local linear regression because the estimated RD impact is 
“local” to the cutoff, relying on a narrow bandwidth of GPAs (Hahn, Todd, & Van der Klaauw, 
2001). The RD analysis relies on the assumption that, if student characteristics are evenly 
distributed across the “treatment” threshold (the 2.0 GPA cutoff), we can attribute any 
differences in outcomes across the threshold to the policy (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008). Using this 
approach, we estimate the difference between two regression functions at the cutoff—one 
estimated below and the other estimated above. The rationale for the local linear approach is that 
focusing on the subset of observations around the cutoff should allow us to more accurately 
 specify the functional form, reducing bias in estimation. To identify the optimal bandwidth 
around the cutoff, we use Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik’s (2014a, 2014b) robust bias-
corrected confidence intervals and Imbens and Kalyanaraman’s (2012) data-driven bandwidth 
selection. We use a bandwidth of 0.5 GPA points as our optimal bandwidth, based on Calonico 
et al.’s procedure, which results in a slightly more conservative estimate. 
The basic model takes the form: 𝑌" = 𝛽% + 𝛽'(𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤") + 𝛽/(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒" ∗ 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤") + 𝛽8(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒" ∗ 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒") + 𝜀" (1) 
where 𝑌" represents the outcome for student i, and 𝛽' provides an estimate of the effect of falling 
below the SAP cutoff on the outcome. Below is a binary indicator of whether or not the student’s 
first-year GPA fell below the cutoff; Above indicates whether the student’s GPA fell above the 
cutoff; Distance is the difference between the student’s cumulative GPA and the 2.0 cutoff. 𝜀" is 
the residual component for student i. We test for sensitivity to bandwidth selection by running 
the basic model on the optimal bandwidth (model 1), a narrow bandwidth (half the optimal 
bandwidth; model 2), and a wide bandwidth (twice the optimal bandwidth; model 3). 
To increase the precision of 𝛽' and to evaluate its sensitivity to additional covariates, we 
include institutional and cohort fixed effects, as well as individual-level measures, in additional 
models run on the optimal bandwidth. These models take the form: 𝑌" = 𝛽% + 𝛽'(𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤") + 𝛽/(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒" ∗ 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤") + 𝛽8(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒" ∗ 𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒") (2) +𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒	𝐹𝐸 + 𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐹𝐸 + 𝛽D𝑋" + 𝜀" 
where CollegeFE represents a vector of institutional fixed effects (entered as a set of dummy 
variables indicating the institution initially attended, with one institution excluded), important 
because the financial aid officers responsible for implementing SAP policy are nested within 
institutions. Using institutional fixed effects also controls for other sources of between-college 
 variation, such as institution-specific academic interventions and initiatives that may influence 
student persistence and attainment. CohortFE is a vector of cohort fixed effects, a necessary 
inclusion because the implementation of campus policies (including timing of SAP notification) 
may vary over time, potentially producing varied effects. 𝑋" represents a vector of individual-
level covariates (and 𝛽D the corresponding estimated effects on the outcome) including race, 
gender, age at initial enrollment, state residency status, dependency status for the purpose of 
financial aid, whether the student is working for pay, earnings during the first semester of 
college, and high school graduation status. Model 4 adds the institution and cohort fixed effects 
to model 1, ensuring that the RD is evaluated first within the institution and cohort before 
aggregating into 𝛽' to calculate the main effect. Model 5 adds the vector of covariates to model 4 
to test for sensitivity to additional covariates. We interpret the final model (model 5) in the 
results section. 
Testing the impact of SAP policy is not without its challenges. Given the nature of the 
state’s grading system—in which only whole letter grades are awarded—and the fact that many 
community college students do not accumulate a lot of credits (making them more likely to only 
have one or two grades comprising their cumulative GPA), we find “heaping” in whole number 
GPAs across the distribution. The first panel in Figure 2 shows the GPA distribution among 
students in our sample. To estimate discontinuities using GPA as the running variable, we first 
must deal with “heaping-induced bias” in our state administrative data (Barreca, Lindo, & 
Waddell, 2011). Following the recommendations of Barreca, Lindo, and Waddell (2011; see also 
Barreca, Guldi, Lindo, & Waddell, 2011), we rely on “donut-RD” estimates, dropping 
observations at the whole number heaps that fall within our bandwidth. A drawback of this 
method is that it cannot estimate how SAP impacts students who tend to be observed in the 
 heaps. Still, the method is consistent with the usual motivation for RD and, based on simulations 
in Barreca, Lindo, and Waddell (2011), offers unbiased estimates.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
While “lumpy” distributions for the running variable are often taken as evidence that 
there is manipulation of the running variable (McCrary, 2008), it is unlikely that students are 
able to manipulate their course grades to fall above the cutoff.  However, we acknowledge that 
including the “whole” GPAs (i.e., 0.0, 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, and 4.0) introduces bias; students with whole 
GPAs may be less likely to persist because the presence of a whole GPA is often the result of 
fewer course credits contributing to the calculated average. The second panel of Figure 2 shows 
the distribution across the wide bandwidth after removing the heaps. The resulting smoothness of 
the donut GPS distribution across the cutoff and insignificant covariate discontinuities, described 
next, supports our decision. Ultimately, we find that using the donut-RD offers more 
conservative estimates. 
To bolster support for an RD approach using students’ first-year GPA as the running 
variable, we first test for discontinuities in covariates around the 2.0 cutoff. Regressions confirm 
that there are no systematic differences between Pell recipients who fell directly below and 
above the cutoff in terms of race, age, working for pay, holding a high school degree, and several 
other observable measures (results available in Table A1 of the Appendix). We find some 
evidence that women were more likely to fall below the cutoff than men, supporting our decision 
to control for gender in our covariate-adjusted model.  
Difference-in-Differences 
An institution’s SAP policy must be at least as strict as the academic requirements for 
graduation, which, in the SCCS, is a 2.0 cumulative GPA. This means that our RD estimates 
 combine any general effects of failing institutional standards for academic performance with the 
specific effects of failing SAP standards for retaining financial aid. Therefore, we also apply a 
difference-in-differences (DD) approach to compare the effects of falling below the GPA cutoff 
among Pell Grant recipients (who face both SAP and general institutional consequences) and 
non-Pell students who do not receive any other form of federal or state aid (those who face only 
general institutional consequences). In essence, we use students who do not receive financial aid, 
which we refer to as “non-Pell students,” as a control group for a comparison of the effects of 
falling below the SAP GPA standard. Among students who do not receive the Pell, only 3 
percent received some other form of federal or state aid that would subject them to SAP 
standards (those students are not included in the analysis). Additional motivations for the DD 
approach are that it allows us to examine the effect of SAP for a wider range of students affected 
by the policy, rather than those right around the cutoff; moreover, the DD also provides greater 
power to detect effects than the RD.  
The tradeoff is that the DD requires stronger assumptions about the relationship between 
first-year GPA and subsequent outcomes than the RD; namely, we must make a “parallel trends” 
assumption that outcomes vary by GPA in the same way for Pell and non-Pell recipients. In a 
community college sample, differences between Pell and non-Pell students are somewhat less 
concerning than in a four-year context, as research suggests that many community college 
entrants who may be eligible for federal grant aid do not file the FAFSA (Bettinger, Long, 
Oreopoulos, & Sanbonmatsu, 2012). More importantly, the parallel trends assumption does not 
require that Pell and non-Pell recipients have the same expected outcomes after controlling for 
GPA. This would be implausible, as we may expect (and indeed observe) that aid recipients have 
lower persistence than students not receiving aid, even when comparing students with the same 
 first-year GPA. Instead, the key assumption of the DD methodology is that whatever underlying 
differences exist between Pell and non-Pell students, these underlying differences are fixed or 
“parallel” across the range of GPAs. If we observe that Pell recipients above the GPA cutoff 
have moderately lower persistence than non-recipients with similar GPAs, but Pell recipients 
below the cutoff have much lower persistence than non-recipients with similar GPAs, the DD 
methodology will identify a negative effect of the policy. 
We compare Pell and non-Pell students falling below and above the cutoff using the 
following basic model (model 1) on the optimal bandwidth: 𝑌" = 𝛽% + 𝛽'(𝑃𝑒𝑙𝑙" ∗ 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤") + 𝛽/(𝑃𝑒𝑙𝑙") + 𝛽8(𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤") + 𝜀"    (3) 
where 𝑌" represents the outcome for student i, Pell is a binary indicator of whether the student 
received the Pell Grant at initial enrollment, and Below is a binary indicator of whether or not the 
student’s GPA fell below the cutoff at the end of year 1. Coefficient 𝛽', our estimate of interest, 
represents the effect of falling below the 2.0 GPA threshold for students who entered college 
with a Pell versus those who did not (the difference-in-differences between students who fall 
below and above the 2.0 GPA threshold at each Pell condition).	𝛽/ is the main effect of Pell on 
the outcome; 𝛽8 is the main effect of falling below the cutoff on the outcome. 𝜀" is the residual 
component for student i. 
We conduct a series of regression analyses, adding institutional and cohort fixed effects 
and individual-level covariates to the basic model: 𝑌" = 𝛽% + 𝛽'(𝑃𝑒𝑙𝑙" ∗ 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤") + 𝛽/(𝑃𝑒𝑙𝑙") + 𝛽8(𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤") + 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒	𝐹𝐸   (4) +𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐹𝐸 + 𝛽D𝑋" + 𝜀" 
where CollegeFE represents a vector of institutional fixed effects and CohortFE represents a 
vector of cohort fixed effects. Coefficient 𝛽' represents the effect of falling below the 2.0 GPA 
 threshold for students who entered college with a Pell versus those who did not in a given 
institution and cohort. 𝑋" represents a vector of individual-level covariates. 𝜀" is the residual 
component for student i. 
Model 2 includes institutional and cohort fixed effects, but does not yet include student-
level covariates. Model 3 adds the distance of students’ GPA from the cutoff (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒") to 
model 2. In order to capture the variation in slopes across Pell status observed above and below 
the GPA threshold, model 4 adds the student’s GPA relative to the cutoff, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒" ∗ 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤", 
to the previous model. Our most comprehensive model, model 5, adds control measures. We 
interpret model 5 in the results section. 
Results 
In this section, we describe the results of our analyses, beginning with the descriptive 
patterns of interest in research question (RQ) 1. Then, we turn to the results from the regression 
discontinuity (RQ2) and the DD analysis (RQ3). 
The Prevalence of SAP Failure and its Descriptive Relationship to Persistence (RQ 1) 
Our administrative data allow us to examine descriptive patterns in SAP failure across 
both the SAP credit requirement and the GPA requirement. We are able to look at these 
measures by academic term, as they are evaluated in the SCCS, rather than by academic year. 
We begin by plotting the rates of failure to meet SAP requirements among all SCCS students 
across entry cohorts in Figure 3, which shows students falling below the GPA and credit ratio 
standards, along with a combined estimate of falling below SAP overall in the first year.  
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
The figure indicates increasing rates of failure over time for the GPA standard, consistent 
with the national data for community colleges. For the years in which we have comparable data, 
 the levels of failure for the GPA requirement are slightly higher in the SCCS sample than we 
observed in the national data in Figure 1. This may simply reflect regional variation, or it may be 
due to the fact that our administrative data represent true first-time entrants in their first term, 
while the NPSAS data include all students with first-year academic standing. Figure 3 also 
indicates that at least as many students are failing the credit standard as are failing the GPA 
standard. Of course, there is some overlap between the two requirements, but accounting for 
students who fail either of the two standards raises the overall first-term SAP failure rate 
substantially, from 25 percent to 42 percent for students who entered in the fall of 2008. 
Figure 4 plots the prevalence of SAP failure and enrollment patterns among Pell 
recipients over the first 3 years of college. To the extent that SAP failure has a consequence, it 
likely shows up as dropout rather than as persistence without financial aid. The figure 
demonstrates that SAP failure is most prevalent in the first term of enrollment, where 
approximately 40 percent of Pell recipients failed SAP in the first term. By the fall of the second 
year, the rate is more than halved (to 16 percent), and by the fall of the third year, the rate is 
halved again (to a little over 8 percent of Pell entrants). The prevalence of SAP failure declines 
over time not because students improve their GPAs overall (though, of course, some do) but 
because many students simply do not reenroll, and those who fail SAP are disproportionately 
likely to drop out (29 percent of Pell recipients who fail SAP in the first term do not return in the 
spring, compared with just 13 percent of Pell recipients who meet SAP standards). The students 
who return in subsequent semesters are thus positively selected and less at risk of SAP failure to 
begin with.  
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 We find that, among SCCS students who remained enrolled after failing SAP, the 
majority continued to receive Pell Grants, likely a result of successful appeal. In the fall term of 
students’ second year, 73 percent of students who failed to meet SAP standards and remained 
enrolled still receive the Pell Grant (though, most Pell recipients who failed SAP dropped out by 
this point—approximately 60 percent). Per institutional policy, students have one semester to 
improve their SAP status while on probation-by-appeal. The rate of Pell retention falls 
significantly after that point. By fall of the third year, 3 percent of Pell entrants who continually 
fall below SAP standards appear to retain the Pell. 
While students who fail to meet SAP requirements are more likely to drop out, the 
difference in retention rates between those who do and do not fail SAP has no obvious causal 
interpretation. Figure 5 provides preliminary evidence for both our RD and DD methods, plotting 
GPA and persistence over time for Pell and non-Pell students. Panel A looks at fall-to-spring 
persistence by first-term GPA, while panel B looks at fall-to-fall persistence by cumulative first-
year GPA (those who drop out during the first year remain in the sample—their GPA at exit is 
carried forward).  
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
Interestingly, panel A indicates that Pell recipients persist to the spring term at higher 
rates than non-Pell students across the GPA spectrum. We do not see any strong changes in 
patterns of persistence around the 2.0 GPA cutoff. Panel B looks quite different. Here, students 
below the 2.0 GPA threshold who entered with Pell Grants appear to have lower rates of 
persistence to the subsequent fall term than non-Pell entrants with similar GPAs; above the 
threshold, the two groups persist at similar rates. It is plausible that the SAP rules embedded in 
the Pell Grant program explain these patterns: The threat of losing the Pell due to SAP rules may 
 discourage students who entered with the Pell from continuing to the fall of their second year. 
We dig deeper into these patterns in our subsequent analyses.  
Effects of Falling Below 2.0 around the Cutoff: Regression Discontinuity Results (RQ 2) 
The RD analysis is our first effort to more closely examine the potential discouragement 
effect of the SAP standards. Table 2 shows the effect of failing to meet the GPA standard at the 
end of the first year of college, when students in the warning period should face the threat of Pell 
loss, on reenrollment in the second year of college, first-term GPA from the second-year, 
certificate and associate degree attainment, and transfer to a four-year college. While we might 
expect to see an immediate negative impact on persistence (whether from Pell loss or 
discouragement due to the threat of Pell loss), the RD results do not support that hypothesis. We 
find null effects across all four outcomes. Our results are imprecise, and small negative effects 
cannot be ruled out. To provide additional insight into the distribution of student outcomes 
across GPA, Figures A1-A5 in the Appendix present the RD results graphically. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Effects of Falling Below 2.0 for Pell vs. Non-Pell Students: Difference-in-Differences 
Results (RQ 3) 
The DD results, presented in Table 3, expand on the patterns observed in Figure 5, panel 
B. In contrast with the RD results (which focus on Pell recipients only), the DD suggests a 
negative effect of SAP on persistence for Pell recipients. Pell students who fail to meet the GPA 
standard for SAP are nearly 5 percentage points less likely to persist to the second year of 
college than non-Pell students who fail to earn a 2.0 GPA but do not face SAP standards 
(p<.001). 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
  While SAP policy appears to negatively impact early college persistence, we find no 
impact on first-year GPA and small positive effects on associate degree attainment and transfer 
to a four-year college within three years of college entrance. Pell recipients who failed to meet 
SAP standards in their first year were approximately 1 percentage point more likely to earn an 
associate degree (p<.05) and 3 percentage points more likely to transfer to a four-year college 
than their non-Pell peers who also fell below the 2.0 mark in their first year (p<.01). Figures A6-
A10 in the Appendix provide graphics of the DD results. 
Taking a closer look at the distribution in the graphic representation, the gap between Pell 
recipients and non-aid recipients does indeed appear larger above and smaller below the 
threshold (see Figure A9 for the associate degree results and, to a lesser extent, Figure A10 for 
transfer in the Appendix). However, the probability that Pell recipients will earn an associate 
degree in three years is so low that students falling below a 2.0 “bottom out” (i.e., they have zero 
probability of earning a degree and cannot go lower), giving the illusion, when merely looking at 
the difference in effects, that Pell students are narrowing in on their non-Pell counterparts. This 
implies that the positive effects for long-term outcomes may be due to floor effects, rather than 
incentivizing effects. Similar patterns emerge for the transfer outcome, but students appear to 
bottom out at a probability of .15 rather than 0. We suspect that this may be a result of students 
being concurrently enrolled at a community college and four-year college, as it seems unlikely 
that a non-negligible portion of students with cumulative GPAs below 2.0 are transferring to 
four-year colleges. Unfortunately, we cannot confirm concurrent enrollment with our data. 
Discussion 
In this paper, we provide evidence regarding the prevalence and consequences of 
students’ failure to meet SAP standards using state administrative data from community colleges. 
 The national trends we highlight in the introduction (refer to Figure 1) suggest that failure to 
meet academic standards is not a Pell recipient–specific phenomenon. Yet while many students 
fail to meet minimum academic standards, SAP policy targets undergraduates from America’s 
most disadvantaged families (most Pell recipients come from families earning under $40,000 
annually) who are in greatest need of support in order to attain a degree and who stand to benefit 
the most from degree attainment (Baum & Payea, 2013). Students who rely on federal financial 
aid to attend college must meet academic standards more quickly than students who can pay for 
college out of pocket, particularly because academic probation in the SCCS has no consequence 
for enrollment, only for graduation. If students become ineligible for the Pell Grant, their net 
price of attending college increases by at least the size of their Pell Grant (or more, if they 
received other financial aid tied to Pell eligibility).  
Based on our descriptive results from SCCS, many Pell recipients—approximately 40 
percent—risk losing aid due to SAP failure. While several forms of information about SAP 
guidelines were provided to SCCS students, it is impossible to confirm from our data that 
students were aware that additional academic requirements are imposed on financial aid 
recipients. If students do not become aware of the requirements until after notification of failure 
at the end of the first semester, prior grades still contribute to the cumulative GPA calculation at 
the end of the first year. Notification of SAP in the middle of year 1 could be too late for some 
students to turn it all around.  
Our descriptive statistics and DD results offer some evidence in support of a 
discouragement effect. Pell recipients experienced greater negative effects of falling below 2.0 
than their non-Pell peers who were subject to only institutional general academic standards. 
However, the RD estimates—which are null—do not bolster support for the discouragement 
 theory, offering little evidence of discontinuous outcome differences for students just above and 
below the GPA cutoff. As we move further below the cutoff, as in the DD analysis, the 
discouragement effect from failing to meet the standard may grow, producing the negative 
impacts on persistence observed in Table 3. Getting back over the 2.0 threshold becomes more 
difficult the farther students fall below it. The impacts of falling below are larger for Pell 
students than non-Pell students because of the threat of financial aid loss. 
At the same time, we cannot entirely rule out the theory that SAP policy may incentivize 
effort among some students. We are hesitant to overemphasize the significant positive impacts of 
SAP on degree attainment and transfer from the DD, particularly given the minimal impact on 
second-year GPA and potential floor effects described above. The direction of the GPA estimate 
leaves the debate over incentivizing effects open, as we do not have evidence to the contrary. At 
the very least, SAP policies do not appear to have a strong, average incentive effect.  
Adjudicating between the null effects in the RD analyses and the statistically significant 
effects in the DD is complicated, as each set of analyses comes with its own assumptions. The 
RD provides more causally rigorous estimates, but also has two limitations. First, it estimates the 
joint effect of failing to meet SAP and general academic standards for students surrounding the 
cutoff. Given the nature of federal policy, SAP policies often coincide with an institution’s 
academic standards. This may mean that the RD provides more reliable estimates because the 
two policies occur jointly in practice (though, it is possible that general academic standards have 
sharper teeth in other institutional settings than they do in SCCS), but the RD is not necessarily 
isolating the impact of SAP failure. Second, the RD focuses on a narrower sample of students—
capturing the impact local to the cutoff, even though our theoretical framework strongly suggests 
that responses to the policy may vary depending upon how far students are from the cutoff. 
 The DD estimates, on the other hand, attempt to isolate the impact of SAP policy, which 
is of interest in examining whether threat of Pell loss, rather than of general academic failure, 
impacts student success. The DD also has the advantage of estimating effects for a wider range 
of students. The DD analysis, however, requires additional assumptions that come with using 
non-Pell students as a control group. Specifically, the DD design requires that any between-
group differences must be fixed/parallel across the range of GPAs considered. If Pell recipients’ 
outcomes are more different from non-recipients’ outcomes below the cutoff than above the 
cutoff, for reasons that have nothing to do with SAP policy, the DD estimate will be biased. Still, 
given trends of imperfect take-up of Pell grant among the Pell-eligible population, we think it is 
plausible that many Pell-eligible students exist within the non-aided student comparison group. 
This would suggest that the two groups may not be so dissimilar after all, but, ultimately, the 
plausibility of the parallel trends assumption is impossible to fully verify.  
An additional consideration in interpreting our results concerns our focus on the GPA 
component. Focusing on the GPA component of SAP, while methodologically necessary, means 
that some students included as “passing SAP” may actually fail to meet the credit ratio standard. 
We estimate that, of the students in our sample who appear to meet the GPA standard, about 
11% of them are failing to meet the credit ratio standard, which would mean a portion of our 
control group is also subject to financial aid ineligibility. This provides another reason why our 
analysis may underestimate the effects of failing to meet SAP. 
Data limitations preclude some additional analyses that would be of interest. For 
example, while the SCCS administrative data provide us with measures of students’ grades, 
credits, and outcomes, we do not have access to their SAP status, as determined by their financial 
aid office. It appears that many students facing Pell loss due to SAP failure initially avoid 
 negative consequences by appealing. While students cannot delay negative effects for too long 
(an appeal only provides one additional semester to meet SAP standards, and all of the standards 
are cumulative), it may dampen the negative effects we observe. Additional data on the status 
awarded by the financial aid office could better illuminate patterns of effects. Furthermore, 
measures of prior academic achievement would be useful in examining effect heterogeneity, but 
are not available in the SCCS data. 
Conclusion 
This paper offers the first attempt to uncover the effects of SAP standards. While the 
analytic approaches we use are sound for the study’s goals, more research is necessary to further 
investigate the effects of SAP. Ideally, a randomized controlled trial, assigning some federal aid 
recipients to meet SAP standards, while waiving the standards for others, would be an ideal 
model for testing the effects of tying academic standards to need-based financial aid. Such a 
study seems unlikely without significant collaboration between researchers, institutions, and 
government officials, since SAP standards are federally mandated. 
While it is possible that SAP improves performance of the students who persist despite 
initial SAP failure, we do not find clear evidence that it incentivizes effort using either 
identification strategy. If anything, our results suggest that weeding out, where students are 
discouraged by information that they failed to meet academic standards by dropping out, is a 
more likely response. It is concerning that SAP policy may push Pell recipients—already notably 
at greater risk of drop out than more affluent students—out of college before they have a chance 
to adjust to the academic demands of college life.  
Even if SAP standards do not incentivize students to improve their grades, it is unlikely 
that policymakers would eliminate performance-based standards—both due to the need to keep 
 the Pell efficient and the potential political backlash of making need-based federal aid seem like 
a handout. Performance-based standards may make policies more politically palatable. 
According to the America’s College Promise fact sheet, President Obama’s “free community 
college” proposal sets performance standards even higher than SAP for federal aid 
(Whitehouse.gov, 2015). To remain eligible, community college students would need to maintain 
a 2.5 GPA, in addition to remaining enrolled half time and demonstrating “steady progress” 
toward a degree (Whitehouse.gov, 2015). In 2012, 37% of first-year CC students earned below a 
2.5, suggesting that a substantial portion of initial America’s College Promise enrollees would 
quickly lose eligibility (authors’ calculations, NPSAS 2012). Although our research cannot speak 
to the ideal placement for standards, it highlights the urgent need to address the fact that many 
students immediately fail to meet standards. While academic preparation is a piece of the puzzle, 
it’s likely additional student support services could help students improve their outcomes and 
would be necessary for a program like America’s College Promise to significantly increase the 
number of students earning a college credential. 
Drawing strong conclusions from our single-state estimates would be premature, 
especially given that the RD does not corroborate our statistically significant DD results, which 
have more questionable internal validity. This study serves as a point of departure from which 
policy scholars should continue exploring the implications of tying need-based aid to 
performance standards. The sheer magnitude of SAP failure—which is not merely concentrated 
in community colleges, but appears just as common in public four-year institutions—indicates 
that researchers interested in higher education policy should no longer ignore the role that SAP 
may play in moderating the effects of federal aid. 
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 Tables 
 
Table 1 
 
Descriptive Statistics: National and State Samples of Community College Students 
 BPS SCCS 
Variable Non-Pell Pell Non-Pell Pella 
White 0.735 (0.442) 
0.517 
(0.499) 
0.738 
(0.440) 
0.513 
(0.500) 
Black 0.090 (0.286) 
0.271 
(0.445) 
0.150 
(0.357) 
0.379 
(0.485) 
Asian 0.044 (0.206) 
0.037 
(0.188)   
Other race 0.105 (0.306) 
0.149 
(0.356) 
0.072 
(0.259) 
0.082 
(0.274) 
Hispanic 0.135 (0.341) 
0.164 
(0.370) 
0.040 
(0.195) 
0.026 
(0.016) 
Female 0.526 (0.499) 
0.705 
(0.456) 
0.508 
(0.500) 
0.674 
(0.469) 
Age 21.875 (7.849) 
22.257 
(6.884) 
23.881 
(9.156) 
23.544 
(7.977) 
State resident 0.954 (0.210) 
0.972 
(0.165) 
0.876 
(.330) 
0.951 
(0.216) 
Dependent 0.668 (0.471) 
0.567  
(0.495)  
0.101 
(.301) 
.514 
(0.500) 
Work for pay 0.786 (0.410) 
0.694  
(0.461) 
0.570 
(.495) 
0.480 
(0.500) 
First semester earnings ($)   
181.935 
(275.194) 
133.89 
(180.32) 
High school graduate 0.879 (0.326) 
0.847  
(0.359) 
0.797 
(.402) 
0.887 
(0.317) 
Expected family contribution 
($) 
11632.41 
(14,314.19) 
899.42 
(1,163.75) 
3295.15b 
(7,236.70) 
758.64 
(1231.24) 
     
N 2,900 1,620 104,545 42,835 
Notes: Table shows averages for Pell and non-Pell community college entrants from the BPS 
04/09 (N= 4,520) and state administrative data from fall entry cohorts from 2002-2007 (N= 
147,380). We used survey weights for the BPS data, which represents 1,144,570 students 
nationally, including a subpopulation of 299,810 Pell recipients and 844,760 non-Pell students. 
In correspondence with National Center for Education Statistics requirements, all sample sizes 
for the BPS are rounded to the nearest 10. 
a The federal Pell Grant is, by far, the most prevalent form of financial aid in the sample, held by 
almost 30 percent of SCCS entrants. 
b While the EFC is available for all non-Pell students in the NPSAS, it is only available for 
students who filed the FAFSA in the SCCS data. Only 7,676 of the 104,545 non-Pell students in 
the sample have data on their EFC, suggesting that only 7% of non-Pell SCCS students filed the 
FAFSA. 
 
 Table 2 
 
SAP Impact on College Outcomes: Regression Discontinuity Effects within 3 Years of Entry 
Outcomes M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Persist into year 2 0.026 0.071 0.03 0.038 0.028 
 (0.024) (0.039) (0.026) (0.023) (0.024) 
First-term, second- year GPA 0.011 0.059 0.004 0.011 0.011 
 (0.038) (0.064) (0.041) (0.038) (0.038) 
Certificate 0.003 0.002 0 0.003 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Associate degree -0.009 -0.01 -0.015 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Transfer to four-year -0.018 0.002 -0.024 -0.014 -0.016 
 (0.020) (0.032) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) 
N 9,064 4,043 18,994 9,064 9,064 
Specifications      
Bandwidth .5 .25 1.0 .5 .5 
Form Linear Linear Quadratic Linear Linear 
Fixed effects No No No Yes Yes 
Covariates No No No No Yes 
Notes: Table presents RD estimator coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. The 
functional form for the optimal (.5) and narrow (.25) bandwidth is local linear, while the 
functional form for the wide (1.0) bandwidth is local quadratic. “Fixed effects” refer to 
institutional and cohort fixed effects, included in the models as a series of dummy variables with 
the reference eliminated. 
* p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
Source: SCCS administrative data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3 
 
SAP Impact on College Outcomes: Difference-in-Differences Results 
Outcomes M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
Persist into year 2 -0.050*** -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.046*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
First-term, second-year GPA 0.010 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.015 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Certificate 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Associate degree 0.009* 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Transfer to four-year 0.030** 0.033** 0.033** 0.033** 0.030** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Specifications:      
Fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Covariates      
   Distance No No Yes Yes Yes 
   Distance*Below No No No Yes Yes 
   Controls No No No No Yes 
Notes: N= 31,768. Table presents DD estimator coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. 
Each model is performed on the optimal (.5) bandwidth with a linear functional form. “Fixed 
effects” refer to institutional and cohort fixed effects, included in the models as a series of 
dummy variables with the reference eliminated. To put results into context, the average for each 
outcome among the control group (non-Pell students who fail to meet SAP): persistence=0.521, 
second-year GPA= 1.660, certificate=0.011, associate=0.021, transfer=0.192. 
* p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
Source: SCCS administrative data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. National Trends in SAP GPA Failure During the First Year of College: Averages 
across Institution Type and Pell Status 
Notes: Figure displays percentage of students failing to achieve a 2.0 or higher GPA in the given 
academic year, estimated using National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS) 2004, 2008, 
2012 data on first-year-equivalent students. Federal SAP regulations require institutions to 
evaluate SAP for all federal aid recipients at the end of each academic year, where they must 
meet a 2.0 by the end of the second year. The left side of the x-axis displays average rates of 
failure for Pell recipients and the rightmost side displays averages for students who do not 
receive the Pell. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of Pell Grant Recipients: Changes in Distribution when Eliminating 
Heaping 
Notes: Panel A shows the distribution of student GPAs across the wide bandwidth, within 1 
grade point of the cutoff (N=20,567, wide bandwidth). There is heaping in the bin containing the 
2.0 cutoff (along with the other .0-containing bins). Panel B shows the distribution of student 
GPAs used for donut-RD analysis, where students with “whole” GPAs are removed from 
analytic sample (N=18,994, wide bandwidth). 
Source: SCCS administrative data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3. First-Term SAP Failure Rates by Entry Cohort (All Beginning First-Years) 
Notes: N= 147,380. The figure presents the percent of first-time SCCS students who fail to meet 
SAP-G, SAP-C, and, subsequently, SAP-overall standards within their first term of enrollment. 
Due to problems with the “credits attempted” measure in 2005 and 2006, we were unable to 
calculate students’ credit ratio, and therefore the overall SAP estimate, for 2005-2006.  
Source: SCCS administrative data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Pe
rc
en
t o
f S
tu
de
nt
s
Cohort Year
First-Term SAP Failure Rates by Entry Cohort 
(All Beginning First-Years)
GPA criterion
Credit% criterion
Overall SAP
  
Figure 4. Enrollment by SAP Status across Academic Terms 
Notes: N=42,835. The figure presents Pell entrants’ enrollment and SAP status over time 
(excluding summer terms, when fewer students are enrolled). In the first term, a small percentage 
of enrolled students have no valid GPA. Otherwise, these categories are mutually exclusive and 
should add to 100 percent. 
Source: SCCS administrative data. 
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Figure 5. Early College Persistence Patterns for Pell and Non-Pell Students 
Notes: N= 147,380. The percent of enrolled is presented within .05 GPA bins. In both panels, 
data for whole GPAs (1.00, 2.00, 3.00, 4.00) are hidden.  
Source: SCCS administrative data. 
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